What Would Kant Say About Abortion?

Post Author: Bill Pratt

Immanuel Kant is a famous philosopher who lived in the eighteenth century.  One of Kant’s most lasting contributions to philosophy was in the field of ethics.  He believed that moral laws could be derived from reason, and that all immoral behavior was, therefore, unreasonable or irrational.

Kant argued for the idea of the categorical imperative, a law of morality that all humans have a duty to obey.  His first formulation of this categorical imperative is the following: “Act only on that maxim whereby thou canst at the same time will that it should become a universal law.”  Kant believed that all moral duties could be deduced from this categorical imperative.

What does this categorical imperative mean?  In essence, if you want to decide whether an act is morally good, then you should be able to will that everyone else would act in the same way.  In other words, the act must be universalizable.

What about abortion?  Kant would say to the woman who wants to have an abortion: “Can you will that every other woman would have an abortion when she is pregnant?”  If the woman says “yes,” then abortion is moral.  If she says “no,” then abortion cannot be moral.

It seems to me that a woman who wanted to have an abortion could not will that every other woman also have an abortion when she is pregnant.  Why?  Because in one generation the human race would go extinct and nobody could have an abortion.  To will that all women have abortions would mean that no women could have an abortion after the current generation died off.  By Kant’s reasoning, this makes abortion irrational and, therefore,  immoral.

Again, according to Kant, abortion would be immoral because it would be irrational to will that every pregnant woman have an abortion.  The act of every pregnant woman aborting the fetus inside her would, ultimately, end abortion, which is completely irrational.

You may not agree with Kant’s categorical imperative, but it does give us an interesting perspective on the issue of abortion.  Fundamentally, those who support a woman’s choice to have an abortion can only support some women choosing abortion, not all.  Presumably and ironically, if all women decided to have abortions, the pro-choice movement would have to become pro-life.

What Is the Eastern Orthodox View of the Atonement?

Post Author: Darrell

Many of those in the Protestant and Catholic traditions are familiar with the Penal Substitutionary Theory of the Atonement (hereafter referred to as Substitutionary Atonement).  However, I have found many to be unfamiliar with the predominant atonement view held by those in the Eastern Orthodox Church, which is commonly called The Recapitulation Theory.

The Recapitulation Theory dates to very early in the Church.  Many believe it had its beginnings with Saint Irenaeus in the second century.  We find it throughout the writings of the early Church Fathers.   Saint Athanasius, the giant of the Nicaean Council, wrote a wonderful book in AD 318 which explains the overall view very well.  It is titled On The Incarnation and was originally written as a letter to one of his disciples.

Substitutionary Atonement focuses on Christ’s suffering and death as the price for man’s sin.  In many ways, the model for Substitutionary Atonement is a courtroom.  Due to his sin, man needed to be made right with a perfect and just God.  Therefore, Christ came to suffer and pay the price in our place, i.e., He substituted Himself for us.  Now, in the courtroom of God, those who accept Christ as their Lord and Savior are judged innocent.  They have a forensic righteousness imputed upon them.

The Recapitulation Theory agrees that God needed to deal with man’s sin.  Man was separated from God as a result of the fall and, left to his own devices, was incapable of returning to God.  However, Recapitulation sees the model through which God dealt with man’s sin as a hospital rather than a courtroom.  Instead of viewing the atonement as Christ paying the price for sin in order to satisfy a wrathful God, Recapitulation teaches that Christ became human to heal mankind by perfectly uniting the human nature to the Divine Nature in His person.  Through the Incarnation, Christ took on human nature, becoming the Second Adam, and entered into every stage of humanity, from infancy to adulthood, uniting it to God.  He then suffered death to enter Hades and destroy it.  After three days, He resurrected and completed His task by destroying death.

By entering each of these stages and remaining perfectly obedient to the Father, Christ recapitulated every aspect of human nature.  He said “Yes” where Adam said “No” and healed what Adam’s actions had damaged.  This enables all of those who are willing to say yes to God to be perfectly united with the Holy Trinity through Christ’s person.  In addition, by destroying death, Christ reversed the consequence of the fall.  Now, all can be resurrected.  Those who choose to live their life in Christ can be perfectly united to the Holy Trinity, receiving the full love of God as Heavenly bliss.  However, those who reject Christ and choose to live their lives chasing after their passions will receive the love of God as hell.

Because of its focus on unification between God and man in the person of Christ, Recapitulation places great importance on the teaching that Christ is both fully man and fully God.  If Christ did not have both natures, He would have been incapable of uniting humanity to divinity, which was the entire purpose of the Incarnation.  As Saint Gregory of Nazianzus said in the fourth century, “That which is not assumed is not healed, but that which is united to God is saved.”  The doctrine of the dual nature of Christ came to the forefront with the third Ecumenical Council in AD 431.  During this council, the Church answered the Nestorian heresy and affirmed Christ’s humanity and divinity and upheld the title of Theotokos (Mother of God) for Mary.  By giving Mary this title, the Church believed we would preserve the teaching of the dual nature of Christ.  If Mary is the Mother of God, then, by necessity, Christ truly is God.  In addition, since Mary is both human and Christ’s mother, Christ is also fully human.

Where are the Kantian Agnostics?

Post Author: Bill Pratt

I’ve been reading the famous eighteenth century philosopher Immanuel Kant lately.  Kant’s theory of knowledge only allowed for human knowledge to extend to those things we can directly experience through our senses.  Kant argued that we could not have direct experience of our self, the cosmos, or God.

Kant’s empiricism ruled out rational knowledge of these three things, so he argued that we must remain agnostic about their existence.  He also argued that for practical reasons, most of us believe that the self exists, that the whole universe (cosmos) exists, and that God exists, but these are positions of faith, not rational knowledge.

Kant’s agnosticism was a turning point in the history of epistemology (the study of knowledge).  What I find interesting is that his brand of agnosticism seems to have fallen by the wayside.

Why do I say this?  Kant argued that since the self, God, and the cosmos cannot be experienced by our senses, we cannot, in principle, make any rational statements about their existence or non-existence.  We just don’t know one way or another.  Kant believed that people who argued that God does not exist are just as foolish as people who argue that God does exist.  Both positions are rationally unprovable.

Most people who call themselves agnostic today don’t seem to hold Kant’s views any longer.  When I meet someone who says they are agnostic, they generally mean something like the following: “I haven’t seen enough evidence to know if God exists.”

The modern agnostic implicitly believes that one can have evidence of God’s existence, and thus rational knowledge of God’s existence, whereas Kant denies that there is ever any chance of there being evidence one way or another.

What is going on?  It seems to me that there are generally two kinds of agnostics today.  The first kind really is undecided on God’s existence and is waiting to hear evidence.  Given that evidence, they may come to decide that God exists.

The second kind of agnostic really believes that all the available evidence is stacked against God’s existence, but they don’t want to call themselves an atheist; maybe the “atheist” label seems too dogmatic.  In everything but name, however, they are an atheist – they know God does not exist.

Kant would think both of these kinds of agnostics are equally wrongheaded.  But where are the Kantian agnostics today?  Are there any left?  Are there any agnostics who truly believe that knowledge of God is impossible and that we must remain forever on the fence about it?  Do these same agnostics believe the same thing about the self and the cosmos?

Just wondering . . .

How Do We Get From DNA to Design?

Post Author: Bill Pratt

I recently wrote a series of three blog posts discussing the argument to design from analogy.  I concluded that this approach to arguing that life is designed is a live option, but that it falls short of the kind of certainty we would like the argument to have.

Philosopher of science Stephen Meyer, in his book Signature in the Cell, points out the weakness in any design argument from analogy:

The status of such design arguments inevitably turns on the degree of similarity betwee the systems in question.  If the two effects are very similar, then inferring a similar cause will seem more warranted than if the two effects are less similar.  Since, however, even advocates of these classic design arguments admit there are dissimilarities as well as similarities between living things and human artifacts, the status of the analogical design argument has always been uncertain.  Advocates argued that similarities between organisms and machines outweighed dissimilarities.  Critics claimed the opposite.

Do modern intelligent design proponents rely solely on design arguments from analogy?  No.  Meyer’s approach is to argue from DNA to design by inference to the best explanation, or abduction.  This is the dominant method used in the historical sciences such as forensic science, evolutionary biology, paleontology, geology, archaeology, and cosmology. 

Meyer explains the difference between argument from analogy and inference to the best explanation with regard to DNA and design:

But the DNA-to-design argument does not have an analogical form.  Instead, it constitutes an inference to the best explanation.  Such arguments do not compare degrees of similarity between different effects, but instead compare the explanatory power of competing causes with respect to a single kind of effect.

So what is the single effect that needs explaining?

As noted, biological information, such as we find in DNA and proteins, comprises two features: complexity and functional specificity.  Computer codes and linguistic texts also manifest this pair of properties (“complexity” and “specificity”), what I have referred to . . . as specified information.  Although a computer program may be similar to DNA in many respects and dissimilar in others, it exhibits a precise identity to DNA insofar as both contain specified complexity or specified information.

Accordingly, the design argument developed here does not rely on a comparison of similar effects, but upon the presence of a single kind of effect – specified information – and an assessment of the ability of competing causes to produce that effect.  The argument does not depend upon the similarity of DNA to a computer program or human language, but upon the presence of an identical feature in both DNA and intelligently designed codes, languages, and artifacts. 

Meyer continues his argument:

Because we know intelligent agents can (and do) produce complex and functionally specified sequences of symbols and arrangements of matter, intelligent agency qualifies as an adequate causal explanation for the origin of this effect.  Since, in addition, materialistic theories have proven universally inadequate for explaining the origin of such information, intelligent design now stands as the only entity with the causal power known to produce this feature of living systems.  Therefore, the presence of this feature in living systems points to intelligent design as the best explanation of it, whether such systems resemble human artifacts in other ways or not.

To summarize, there is specified information in DNA, and the only cause of specified information we know of is intelligent agency.  Therefore the cause of DNA is intelligent agency or design.  To refute this argument, you must demonstrate that there is not specified information in DNA, or that specified information can be caused by non-intelligent processes.  Neither of these has been done, to my knowledge, so this argument to design seems to remain valid.

Why Should Abortion Be Legal?

Post Author: Bill Pratt

According to Dr. Wendy Savage of Doctors For A Woman’s Choice On Abortion, on a recent edition of Unbelievable?, the reason that abortion should be legal is:

  1. Women, throughout recorded history, have always wanted to be able to have abortions.
  2. Women will procure abortions whether they are legal or not.
  3. Illegal abortions tend to be unsafe and sometimes cause the death of the woman.
  4. Therefore, in order to save women’s lives, we must legalize abortions to make them safe.

Madeleine Flannagan, her opponent on the show, asked her the rather obvious question:  “How does the taking of the innocent lives of millions of babies justify the prevention of the deaths of thousands of women?”

Savage’s response: “They are not babies.  Before birth, they are fetuses, which are only potential human beings, not actual human beings.”

Flannagan: “What is your argument to show that they are only potential human beings instead of actual human beings before birth?”

Savage: “The fetus relies on the mother to survive.”

Flannagan: “So does a newborn baby.”

Savage: “Nobody really knows when the fetus becomes a real human being, so we just have to trust mothers’ choices and feelings in the matter.”

Surpisingly, after making a weak attempt to argue why fetuses aren’t actual human beings, Savage punted on the whole issue and said that we just have to trust women’s feelings and instincts about this issue!  Savage’s argument is that women’s feelings in this decision trump all other considerations.  Women are going to have abortions, so we might as well make them legal so the abortions are done properly.

I was stunned that Savage seemed to believe that the question of the rights of the fetus was almost completely irrelevant.  She repeatedly said that she was a pragmatist on abortion and that she had not developed any real position on when a fetus becomes a human being with a right to life.  For her, it just doesn’t matter.  She said several times on the show that she just trusts women to make the right decision.

It is incredible to me that a leader in the pro-abortion movement has such a weak argument for their case.  If we should just legalize whatever many people are going to do anyway, then why not legalize drugs, prostitution, possession of any kind of firearm, defaulting on contracts, polluting the environment, stealing in general, insider trading, and dog fighting (I’m sure I could come up with more given more time).

Of course, none of these are nearly as serious an ethical issue as abortion, so I assume that Ms. Savage would have no problem with legalizing any of them.  Absurd?  Of course.  But Savage’s reason for allowing abortion is absurd.

Is Life Designed? Part 3

Post Author: Bill Pratt

In the first two parts of this series, I presented Mark Isaak’s arguments from his 2003 article.  In this article, his central contention was that human design and life are not analogous; there are at least six important differences that make the analogy break down.

Analogies imply that there are similarities and differences between two things.  An analogy works if the similarities outweigh the differences, or if the similarities are in the essential properties of the two things and the differences are in the accidental properties of the two things. I recap below each point Isaak made:

1. Human design includes blueprints, tools, and other evidence of the design process.  Life shows no evidence of a design process.

I argued that actually possessing evidence of a design process is not an essential property of making an inference to human design.  Additionally, since Isaak wrote his article, we do see the design process in labs that are designing artificial life forms, which weakens Isaak’s point further.

2. Human designs display simple organization.  Life displays complex organization and intermodular interdependence.

I argued that simple organization is not an essential property of human design.  In fact, the more complex human designs are, the more likely we are to attribute design.

3. Human designs are manufactured.  Life is characterized by reproduction, growth, and development.

I argued that manufacturing which excludes self-replication is not an essential property of human design.  After all, we have examples of human designers combining self-replication and manufacturing processes.

4. Human designs are generally repaired from the outside.  Life is self-healing, at least in part.

I argued that human designs are not always repaired from the outside, and that this is therefore not an essential atrribute of human design.

5. In human design form follows function.  In life, forms follow nested hierarchy.

I argued that human design does not always have form following function, and therefore this attribute of human design is not essential.

6. In human design, there is rapid change.  In life, there is slow change.

I argued that human designs change both rapidly and slowly, so rapid change cannot be an essential attribute of human design.

After examining all of Isaak’s differences between human design and life, it seems to me that he has not made the case that life does not look designed.  He has identified accidental or secondary attributes of some human designs, but claimed that these are essential or primary attributes of all human design.

Where does this leave us?  It convinces me that the design argument from analogy is a live option.  Arguments from analogy are never certain, but as scientists continue to make technological advances of the kind Craig Venter’s team is making, I see the design argument from analogy only getting stronger.

Is Life Designed? Part 2

Post Author: Bill Pratt

In part 1 of this series, I introduced Mark Isaak’s 2003 article which argued that human designs are not analogous to life, and that an argument to design using the analogical method fails.  Mark Isaak listed six attributes of human design that are not found in life, and now we take up attribute number three from his list, which I’ve copied again below. 

  1. Human design includes blueprints, tools, and other evidence of the design process.  Life shows no evidence of a design process.
  2. Human designs display simple organization.  Life displays complex organization and intermodular interdependence.
  3. Human designs are manufactured.  Life is characterized by reproduction, growth, and development.
  4. Human designs are generally repaired from the outside.  Life is self-healing, at least in part.
  5. In human design form follows function.  In life, forms follow nested hierarchy.
  6. In human design, there is rapid change.  In life, there is slow change.

Difference number three:  Isaak notes that human designs are manufactured in some way, whereas life reproduces, grows, and develops.  My first reaction is to ask: Why does reproduction preclude design?  And are there not numerous examples of human scientists manufacturing life through cloning processes?  What about Craig Venter’s team manufacturing synthetic life forms?  Add to this that one of the express purposes of some forms of nanotechnology is self-replication, the very thing that Isaak claims only life can do.  This alleged difference between human design and life simply collapses under inspection.

Difference number four:  Isaak claims that human designs are repaired from the outside, whereas life is capable of partial self-healing.  Again, the distinction falls apart.  There are self-healing materials that scientists are developing to prevent cracking in structures; I’m sure other examples of self-healing technologies could be found.  Humans consider self-healing to be a property of design that is highly beneficial and are making rapid progress in its development.  Why does Isaak assume that human designs are incapable of reaching this goal?

Difference number five:  According to Isaak, in human design form follows function, but in life forms follow nested hierarchy.  Isaak argues that a “human hand, a bat’s wing, a mole’s paw, a dog’s paw, and a whale’s flipper all have the same basic bone structure, despite their different functions of grasping, flying, digging, running, and swimming.”  In other words, the singular form of the bone is used in different animals to perform many different functions.  This idea of a singular form being used for many different functions, he argues, is not seen in human designs.

But that is just not true.  Take the field I work in: semiconductors.  For any integrated circuit, there are a limited number of forms that are employed (e.g., resistors, capacitors, transistors).  These very few forms are put to use in a multitude of different functions: amplifiers, receivers, timers, filters, switches, just to name a few.  The whole semiconductor industry is built on the idea that a handful of forms can be used to design millions of different functions.  This is identical to what Isaak sees in life, so he has failed to find a true difference between human design and life.

Difference number six:  Isaak argues that human designs change rapidly, whereas life changes slowly.   I think we can all agree that life has clearly changed over its history.  After all, isn’t that the whole point of evolution, a theory which Isaak defends? 

According to evolution, modern human designers have only been around for tens of thousands of years.  Some of the tools that humans designed in their early history have changed slowly (e.g., knives and wheels), and some of the tools have changed rapidly (e.g., communication technology). 

But this is exactly the same case in life.  Some animals have changed slowly over their evolutionary history (e.g., sharks), but some have changed rapidly (e.g., primates).  Isaak’s argument struggles because slowness and rapidity are relative terms.  Rapid compared to what? 

I can’t see any way for Isaak to differentiate successfully between human design and life with regard to the rapidity of change unless he merely says that life has been changing for billions of years and human designs have been changing for thousands of years.  Yes, that’s a difference, but what of it?

In part 3 of this series, I will draw together some conclusions about Mark Isaak’s argument that life and human design are not analogous.

Is Life Designed? Part 1

Post Author: Bill Pratt

In an article written in 2003, Mark Isaak explored “What Design Looks Like.”  The central argument of the article was simple.  According to Isaak, creationists who claim that life is designed are using an argument from analogy –  the analogy is between human design and biological life.  In his article, Isaak lists 11 attributes of human design and then looks at life to see if it shares these same 11 attributes.

Isaak agrees that human design and life share 5 attributes: 1) intermediate level of structural complexity, 2) modular structure, 3) evidence of careless modification (jury-rigging, vestigial parts), 4) change over time; new forms are modifications of previous forms and 5) functional integration.  If we stopped here, Isaak thinks that the argument from analogy would work, that life would compare favorably to human design.

But, Isaak then goes on to list 6 attributes of human design that life does not possess.

  1. Human design includes blueprints, tools, and other evidence of the design process.  Life shows no evidence of a design process.
  2. Human designs display simple organization.  Life displays complex organization and intermodular interdependence.
  3. Human designs are manufactured.  Life is characterized by reproduction, growth, and development.
  4. Human designs are generally repaired from the outside.  Life is self-healing, at least in part.
  5. In human design form follows function.  In life, forms follow nested hierarchy.
  6. In human design, there is rapid change.  In life, there is slow change.

Isaak’s conclusion: the design argument from analogy fails.  There are too many differences between human design and life for the analogy to hold.  Isaak explains: “In particular, life’s growth and reproduction alone are enough, it seems to me, to place life and design in quite separate categories. Life’s complexity and its nested hierarchy of traits are also highly significant differences. The overall conclusion is clear: life looks undesigned.”

If you are like me, you are scratching your head.  Something seems very odd about what Isaak says counts against life being designed.  Let me slow it down a little bit.

First, he argues that life can’t be designed because we don’t have blueprints, or tools, or any other evidence of a life design process.  But surely we, standing here today, don’t have direct experience of every design process ever used.  Don’t we routinely discover objects of antiquity where we do not understand immediately how they were designed?

Take the example of the ancient Egyptian pyramids.  Haven’t modern scientists struggled for decades trying to figure out how the giant Egyptian pyramids were designed and constructed?  There have been numerous theories about what the actual processes were.  Does the fact that we don’t have blueprints for the ancient pyramids mean they weren’t designed?  If those blueprints were found, would anyone seriously suggest that it is only after the blueprints were found we could conclude that the pyramids were designed?

But it gets worse for Isaak.  With regard to life, there are labs designing artificial life forms as we speak (Craig Venter).  Granted, they are a long ways off from designing all the kinds of life we see around us, but there certainly are life design processes developing.  So Isaak’s argument fails twice.

Second, Isaak argues that because life displays complex organization with intermodular interdependence, it cannot be designed.  This strikes me as completely bizarre.  What he is saying is that because biologists have not been able to reduce life down to simple, independent subsystems that do not interact with each other, life cannot be designed.

But it is the amazing complexity and interdependence of biological systems that cause most scientists to react in awe to the genious of life.  The complexity should count toward design, not against.  Somehow Isaak argues just the opposite – because we can’t break life down into simple non-interacting parts, it can’t be designed.  That strikes me as a complete non sequitur

In the next post of this series, I will address more of Mark Isaak’s 6 alleged differences between human design and life.  Stay tuned.

Apostle Philip’s Tomb Found

Post Author: Bill Pratt

The Bible History Daily website announced in July 2011 that archaeologists had discovered the Apostle Philip’s tomb.  Here is an excerpt from the article:

Italian archaeologists working at the site of Hierapolis in southwestern Turkey believe they have discovered the tomb of St. Philip, one of Jesus’ 12 apostles. According to excavator Francesco D’Andria, Philip’s tomb has traditionally been associated with the martyrium church built at the site,* though no evidence of the ancient burial was ever found. Last month, however, D’Andria and his team located a smaller church less than 150 feet away from the martyrium that appears to contain the grave of the apostle.

Please go the Bible History Daily for the complete article.

Is “Who Designed the Designer?” a Good Argument?

Post Author: Bill Pratt

The intelligent design movement claims that when we look at certain features of the natural world, we are justified in inferring that these features were designed by an intelligent agent or designer.  The exact arguments are hashed out elsewhere on this blog and in numerous books and websites.

One of the most common responses to the inference that a feature of the natural world is designed is the question: “Well then, who designed the designer?”  The point of this question seems to be that merely positing a designer is useless unless we can say what caused the designer.

In a recent post written by Barry Arrington on the Uncommon Descent blog, he refutes the idea that we must know the cause of a designer before we can infer that a designer exists.  Here is his  short, but clear refutation:

Step 1:  Assume that Craig Venter succeeds in developing an artificial life form and releases it into the wild.

Step 2:  Assume that a researcher (let’s call him John) later finds one of Venter’s life forms, examines it, and concludes that it was designed by an intelligent designer.

Step 3:  John’s design inference is obviously correct.  Note that John’s design inference is not any less correct if he (a) does not know who Craig Venter is; and (b) is unable to say who designed Craig Venter.

Craig Venter is , of course, a famous scientist who is doing research on synthetic life forms, so he serves Arrington’s refutation well.  I hope you can see why the demand to say who designed Craig Venter is completely irrelevant to the inference that Venter designed the artificial life form.  The fact that John discovered that this life form was designed is an important scientific finding, in and of itself.

The goal of asking “Who designed the designer?” as a way of derailing design inferences just does not work.

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